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This thesis discusses the evolution of U.S. -Puerto Rican
relations and the current drive to permanently define the
island's political status. It analyzes the pros and cons of
the three status options (statehood, independence, and
enhanced commonwealth) in terms of U.S. national interest.
It argues that the status selected will have significant
implications for the U.S. interests, especially in the
military (Caribbean security and the war on drugs) and
economic spheres.
The thesis examines the historical and present day
influence of the U.S. Congress on Puerto Rico's political
status. In so doing it indicates what dominant national
interest will most likely affect the outcome of a status
Plebiscite. It concludes that the most desirable status
option for the United States and the Caribbean is the en-
hanced commonwealth status. However, Congress should approve
a binding plebiscite only when Puerto Ricans have expressed
a clear consensus for any particular option (no less than 60
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THE FUTURE STATUS OF PUERTO RICO: IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S.
FOREIGN POLICY
Puerto Rico came to us voluntarily and without blood-
shed. She welcomed us with open arms. Her adherence to
the United States during the Spanish war saved the loss
possibly of many lives and the expenditure of millions
of money. Her people welcomed the armies under Miles as
deliverers and benefactors. They professed themselves
ready to become peaceable and loyal citizens of this
country ... They are orderly, law abiding, and anxious
for development ... If any people on earth deserve fair
and considerate treatment at our hands it is the people
of Puerto Rico.
Representative Jacob H. Bromwell,
19001
Puerto Rico consists of six islands in the Caribbean
located about 1,000 miles southeast of Florida. The popu-
2 ...
1 at ion is comprised of roughly 3.5 million Hispanic citi-
zens of the United States, which gives it a population
greater than 27 American states.
The recent history of the islands is one that has been
dominated by its ever-shifting political status in the
aftermath of the Spanish-American War. It was the United
States that emerged as the prevailing power in Puerto Rico
at the war's conclusion. Thus the island's political status
Jose Carbranes, Citizenship end the American Empire, (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1979)
Senate, Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, Puerto
Rico Status Referendum Act, report prepared by Senator John-
ston, 101st Cong., 1st sess., 1989, p. 18.
was and is today defined within the dynamics of the United
States-Puento Rico relationship.
Puerto Rico has been a commonwealth of the United States
since 1952; a position resented by many Puerto Ricans who
would prefer statehood or independence.
Prom time to time, the United States government has
sought to modify the nature of Puerto Rican relations. That
attempt has been driven by numerous factors such as the
intense political pressure exerted by Puerto Rico's leaders,
the island's role in Caribbean security (particularly during
World War I up through the Cold War Era), and the current
international trend towards self-determination for formerly
subjugated countries. However, the issue of Puerto Rico's
unresolved political status has been largely relegated to
the backburners of United States congressional and presiden-
tial concerns. Nonetheless, it continues to persist as a
significant issue for U.S. "foreign" policy.
In general, Puerto Rico has derived some enormous polit-
ical, social, and economic benefits from its commonwealth
status vis-a-vis the United States, in ways that the rest of
Latin America has not. The pros and cons of this treatment
and subsequent political status developments have often
been discussed in terms of the Puerto Rican perspective.
This thesis will focus on Puerto Rico's future from the
perspective of the U.S. government. In the case of Puerto
Rico's political status, a most basic premise is that mat-
10
ters affecting U.S. national interest will, in most cases,
be decided primarily by the legislative process and U.S.
foreign and domestic policies. When according levels of
importance to various factors, the major influence upon the
outcome of the future status of Puerto Rico lies in the
degree of dependency and political friction which has been
perpetuated by the intimate embrace of the United States. It
follows that the status issue is not strictly one of the
right to self-determination. Indeed, practicality dictates
that this issue be looked at in terms of the goals of the
U.S. foreign policy position for both Puerto Rico and the
Caribbean as whole, and what is perceived as being best for
the national interest of the United States..
In 1991, the people of Puerto Rico were to have an oppor-
tunity to vote on their future political status in relation
to the United States. In doing so, it might have appeared
that the United States had become involved in a sincere
effort to "assist free peoples to work out their own desti-
nies in their own way",° but legislative efforts became not
only bogged down in the course of the complicated congres-
sional process, but completely stifled by personal and
public concerns as well.
It is the finding of this thesis that it is in the best
interest of the United States to have its elected officials
Richard S. Kirkendall, "Truman Doctrine", Encyclopedia Ameri
cana. Volume 27. (New York: Americana Corporation, 197t0 p,
176.
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perform a comprehensive examination of the viability of the
three options being offered and their potential implica-
tions for United States foreign policy, particularly in the
military, terrorism, political, an economic spheres.
The options are: statehood, independence, enhanced
commonwealth status, or the status quo by default. The first
two choices would signal the final evolution of Puerto
Rico's political status. However, any new status choice will
necessarily result in changes in Caribbean relations in
general
.
Once the optimum choice has been identified, then the
delicate task of using the democratic process to ensure the
most favorable outcome for the United States will begin.
Although some American presidents and congressmen have
expressed adamant support for the idea of statehood, and
even a token tolerance for the idea of independence, it is a
given that realpol it ik [political reality as opposed to
political idealism) tends to produce a foreign policy solu-
tion that is least drastic and disruptive for the United
States and the region in question. Although the status quo
represents the least drastic and disruptive of the choices,
the argument of this thesis is that the United States
Congress should commit itself to passing status legisla-
tion when and only when there exists a clearly expressed
consensus (more than 60% support for an option) among
Puerto Ricans for a preferred status. Therefore, until that
condition can be fulfilled, it is the current commonweal th
status that will be shown to best suit the national inter-
est. In addition, enhancement features can be added on
without having to hold a plebiscite. This will alleviate
some of Puerto Rico's economic problems and give more auton-
omy to the Puerto Rican government.
The foreign policies of the United States change in
response to the evolution of perceived U.S. national inter-
ests as the/ are articulated by the President, Congress, and
oi,, ar national leaders. Puerto Rico's political status
evolved largely in response to U.S. congressional action and
changing U.S. national interests. Therefore, the historical
as well as present-day congressional role in resolving
Puerto Rico's status question will be examined, while the
factors which contributed to the apparent failure of the
101st Congress to produce status referendum legislation will
also be analyzed.
Ultimately, congressional attitudes and patterns have
historically allowed American interests decide the island's
political status. This interests often have little direct
link to Puerto Rico's right to self-determination. This
thesis will demonstrate that legislative efforts by the
101st Congress failed to produce a referendum bill for
numerous reasons, the primary one being the threat of the
potential costs to the- federal budget.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
On November 19, 1693, Columbus discovered the island
called Boriauen by the native Indians. He renamed the
island San Juan Bautista, and subsequently, set in motion a
chain of events that eventually led to the imposition of
Spanish rule, African slavery, and the emergence of a dis-
tinct racial, cultural "Puerto Rican". The new Puerto Rican
forged his own identity and continually rebelled against
government abuses throughout the four centuries of Spanish
rule and later, commonwealth relationship.
In 1S9£, the Spanish-American war broke out and Cuba and
Puerto Rico became hapless pawns in the quest for American
expansion. Military strategists such as Alfred T. Mahan
clearly ascribed strategic value to Puerto Rico when he
said :
Puerto Rico, considered militarily, is to Cuba, to the
future isthmian Canal and to our Pacific coast, what
Malta is, or may be, to Egypt and the beyond.
The outcome of the war was a decisive victory for the
United States, for in October of 1893 the United States War
Department presided over the incorporation of Puerto Rico
into the military geographical department. This acquisition
4. Morton J. Gelding, A Short Histor-y Of Puerto Rico, (New York:
New American Library, Inc., 1973) p. xiii-xv.
5. Alfred T. Mahan, Lessons of the l-Jsr with Spain (Boston: 1918),
p. 29
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furthered the goal of United States expansion in the Carib-
bean for the fulfillment of strategic and economic national
objectives, without benefit of clear political objectives
for the Puerto Rico United States relation.
As a result, American policymakers were driven to make
changes to Fuerto Rico's status primarily in response to
perceived crises in U.S. national security. These gradual
additions of political rights were delivered as token ges-
tures of goodwill, without the promise for future self-
determination. However, the expectations for political
equality were taken seriously by the Puerto Rican people.
Thus the foundation for the current dilemma of who and how
Puerto Rico's political status will be defined was laid long
ago.
Fuerto Rican history is full of examples of men and
women struggling to elevate their island's status by advanc-
ing the causes of either independence, statehood, or common-
wealth status. Those who supported the commonwealth proposi-
tion obtained some measure of satisfaction when the Common-
wealth Constitution of Puerto Rico was inaugurated on the
island on July 25, 1952. However, the debate over Puerto
Rico's status continued even after the adoption of the
Commonwealth Constitution, and the status referendum held in
1967.
In 1991, the people of this island were to have the
opportunity to vote on their future political status in
relation to the United States. It was President George Bush
who acted as the catalyst for the ensuing status legislation
effort. President Bush, in his very first appearance before
Congress on February 9, 1989 reiterated his support for
statehood for Puerto Rico by urging Congress to begin the
process that would lead to a vehicle for the island's self-
determination. The President's call to action was subse-
quently answered and led by Senate Energy and Commerce
Committee Chairman, J. Bennett Johnston, a Democrat from
Louisiana, and James A. (IcClure, a Republican from Idaho.
Their ultimate goal was to once and for all settle the
status question by drafting a se If -execut ing bill that would
in effect obligate the United States government to implement
whatever option was chosen in a Puerto Rican plebiscite.
16
III. DEFINING THE STATUS OPTIONS
The following section will define and analyze the status
options available to Puerto Rico.
An understanding of the central nature of the three
status options involved is paramount in the decision-making
process. Enhanced commonwealth, statehood and independence
are not just political status choices. Indeed their economic
implications have undergone as much) if not more scrutiny.
Intensive query into the options has already been completed
by select committee members of the 101st Congress. The
recorded results constitute a firm foundation for any future
Congress to produce plebiscite legislation.
A. ENHANCED COMMONWEALTH STATUS
The United States and Puerto Rico share a common defense,
market, and currency under the present commonwealth status.
However, the nature of this option has changed since its
endorsement in the 1967 plebiscite. It now goes beyond
opting for maintaining the status quo and instead, empha-
sizes the need for an enhanced commonwealth status that is
intended to be more beneficial to both the United States and
Puerto Rico in a variety of ways. First, it is the far less
disruptive choice, with the least risks and minimal un-
knowns. Second, the mutual economic advantages for the
United States and Puerto Rico will serve to strengthen both
17
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economies, and in fact, lessen the current financial drain
upon the United States.
When Puerto Rico first became an American commonwealth
in 1952 it gained considerable autonomy over matters of
local self-government that was a marked departure from its
former long-standing relationship with Spain. The adoption
of the Jones Act of 1917 and the Crawford-Butler Act of 1947
specifically represented a substantial step toward home
rule. For example, Puerto Ricans elect their own gover-
nor and bicameral legislature, and there is an effective
government and political infrastructure in place.
The commonwealth status has an inherently high degree of
built-in flexibility, although Commonwealth leaders at-
tempted to perfect some aspects of the status in 1959, 1963,
and 1974 without success. No doubt, mainland U.S. leaders
could be more responsive to the preferences of Puerto Rican
citizens by formulating more mutually satisfying policies.
It is, by and large, the flexibility of commonwealth status
has given commonwealth its long-term legitimacy among the
majority of island, mainland, and international political
actors
.
An increased degree of autonomy is a feature of the
proposed enhanced commonwealth status that would appear to
6. Pamela S. Fa Ik, The Political Status Of Puerto Rico, (Massa-
chusetts: Americas Society, 1986), p. 5.
IS
satisfy a great many Puerto Ricans arid be simultaneously
agreeable to the United States.
Enhanced commonwealth provisions give the governor
the authority to promote Puerto Rico's international
interests; the president may intervene only after 30
days if such action is seen as contrary to U.S. policy.
At the same time, any major Federal action affecting
Puerto Rico would have to be accompanied by a document
evaluating the consistency of the proposed action with
Pthe policy referred to above.
Under an enhanced commonweal t hi status, even though: the
Puerto Rican people are U.S. citizens, politically it would
be the United States that would still have the greater
control in a number of ways. Mainland political parties can
tap the islanders for support during presidential primaries
even though Puerto Ricans would not be able to vote in
presidential elections. Neither will Puerto Ricans have a
vote in the United States Congress. In effect, it is Ulash-
ington that will make decisions on Puerto Rico's partici-
pation in federal programs, based on reasons that have
nothing to do with equal treatment under the laws guaranteed
o
by the United States Constitution. Puerto Rico is not
without representation in the U.S. Congress under the com-
7. Regina Brzozowski, "Puerto Rico: Views on Status Alterna-
tives", The Times of the Americas, 26 July 1989, p. 5.
8. Office Of The Assistant Secretary Of Defense Memorandum to
DASD Brown, Inter-American Affairs, Subject; Statehood, Inde-
pendence and Commonwealth Legislation for Puerto Rico, 25 May
1989.
9. Regina Brzozowski, "Fuerto Rico: Views on Status Alterna-
tive", The Times of the Americas, 26 July 1989, p. 6.
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monwealth status. Indeed, the presence of Puerto Rico's
Resident Commissioner ensures the political representation
of the Puerto Rican people on the floor of the House of
Representatives, albeit as a non-voting member.
Among the list of several benefits associated with the
commonwealth status, is the obtainment of an invaluable
source of military draftees. In fact, many Puerto Ricans
have seen service since World War I. Approximately 18,000
Puerto Ricans served in the American military at that time,
and some were used to defend key installations in the Panama
Canal Zone. Again, during World War II, over 65,03m. island
Puerto Ricans supplemented the United States' war effort.
Furthermore, in the Korean Conflict, more soldiers came from
Puerto Rico than from 20 states, and their numbers of in-
juries surpassed all states per capita. Puerto Rican forces
were utilized in Vietnam as well. The 270 Puerto Rican
combat deaths place the island's contribution of military
personnel ahead of 14 states. More recently, over 15,000
1
1
Puerto Ricans fought in Operation Desert Storm. In addi-
tion to this significant contribution is the fact that the
United States has been able to establish a strong military
presence in the Caribbean in part by developing army, air
10. Congressional Record - Senate, 14 March 1991, p. S3462.
11. Tom Wicker, America's Captive Nation, New York Times 22 Feb
91
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force, and navy bases on federal government -control led land
in Puerto Rico.
It is the economic benefits that are by far the most
obvious reasons for continuing the commonwealth status.
Over 300 subsidiaries of major U.S. -owned corporations are
based in Puerto Rico, and these subsidiaries generate a
i 2total profit of over $o billion annually . The primary
lure for building plants there for these successful corpora-
tions has been the enormous tax breaks (to the tune of 32
billion a year) that have been made available. As a result,
the island has become a manufacturing base for- apparel,
1 3electronics, and pharmaceuticals. Furthermore, the United
States derives benefits from the commonwealth status
through a we 1 1 -entrenched economic monopoly.
American corporations produce goods whose primary
market is in the United States, and this is so not
because there is a United States market for specifically
Puerto Rican goods, or even goods made from specifical-
ly Puerto Rican materials, but because Puerto Rico is a
convenient place for converting raw materials brought to
the island into goods that mainland citizens of the
United States will buy. The consumer goods flooding the
island are, at the same time, essentially those of the
United States. They sre sold in Puerto Rico in chains
of supermarkets such as ...J.C. Penney, and Woolworth,
all United States owned.
12. Micheal H. Erisman, The Caribbean Chal le-nge : U.S. Policy In
A Vol it ile Region, (Boulder: West view Press, 1984), p. 81.
13. Harry McPherson, "Puerto Rico's Choice." Washington Post,
May 15, 1990.
14. Byron Williams, Puerto Rico: Commonwealth, State, On Na-
tion?, pp. 200-201.
21
Puerto Ricsns too enjoy special economic and social
benefits. The right to unrestricted emigration to the United
States acts as a "safety valve" to reduce population
1 5pressure and continued rural-urban drift. According to
the New York Times exemptions for payment of federal income
taxes, coupled with free access to the mainland market has
also helped the development of the economy by enabling
Puerto Rican and U.S. firms to create more jobs. Addition-
ally, the island receives over $6 billion annually in feder-
al assistance programs. The island has further been able
to provide essential services via their own effective state
income tax structure. These unique benefits have produced
superb economic performance overall. In fact, "the densely
populated, resource-poor island now enjoys a living standard
far above that of any Caribbean or Latin American nation."
The proposed "enhanced" commonwealth status would go so
far as to grant Puerto Rico quasi -sovereign powers, like the
ability to negotiate trade agreements with other countries.
Puerto Rico would be both free to restrict imports of com-
peting Latin American agricultural produce, and able to
control which foreign airlines fly to and from the island.
15. Carlos E. Santiago and Erik Thorbecke, "A Mul t isect ional
Framework for the Analysis of Labor and Development in
LDCS : An Application to Postwar Puerto Rico", Economic
Deve lopment and Cultural Chancre, Vol 37, No. 1. Oct 198S.
16. Peter Passell, "Debate on Puerto Rico Rests on a Bottom
Line", New York Times, 15 May 1990.
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The goal of these new powers would be as Governor Rafael
Hernandez Colon stated, "to make Puerto Rico the economic
gateway between Europe and Latin America".
A stronger Puerto Rican economy could result from an
improved commonwealth status, and given the fact that Puerto
Rico absorbs about $850 million (roughly 10 percent) of the
U.S. food stamp program, and that the per capita income is
less than half that of the mainland, the United States too
would benefit since it would no longer have to prop up the
island's economy to such a great extent
Puerto Rico's phenomenal growth can be directly at-
tributed to the ability of people to capitalise on the
positive features of the commonwealth status. Therefore,
there are those who oppose any modification of the current
status, arguing that any change could adversely affect the
1 Prate of growth .
This economic dependence upon the mainland is the most
glaring disadvantage of the commonwealth status for Puerto
Rico. Measurable economic successes have been offset by the
fact that Puerto Rico could not thrive without aggressive
U.S. economic policies. In effect, some of these policies
actively reinforce the weaknesses of the island's economy.
17. H. Michael Erisman, The Caribbean Chal lengte : U.S. Policy in
a Vol stile Region, p. 81.
18. United States-Puerto Rico Commission, Status Of Puerto Rico,
(Washington D.C.: GPO, 1966), p. 53.
For example, federal corporate tax-free manufacturing ac-
counts for 40 percent of the output, but agricultural pro-
1 9duction contributes a mere 1.5 percent. This level of
agricultural output is unusually low for a tropical island,
and results in an excessive need to import food items, thus
exacerbating dependency.
The effects of an oversupply of labor also contribute to
Puerto Rico's economic woes. Federal minimum wage laws have
kept worker compensation high relative to island standards.
This. combined with the unrestricted right to mainland
migration under the commonwealth status, have worked to keep
labor costs close to those of the United States. Low per
capita output, coupled with high worker compensation, dis-
courages labor-intensive industry growth that would other-
wise absorb excess workers. One result is that the govern-
ment is constantly pressured to provide well-paying govern-
ment jobs to one in four Puerto Ricans, knowing that its
ability to do so is contingent upon the continuation of
massive federal aid and tax revenues from corporations drawn
on
to the island by special tax breaks. Lastly, the substan-
tial dollar amount of direct federal assistance afforded
under the commonwealth status may be viewed by some in
Washington as an amount that should be curtailed, perhaps
19. Peter Passel, "Debate on Puerto Rico Rests on a Bottom
Line", New York Times, 15 May 1990.
20. Ibid.
24
because of the budget deficit or frustration with the per-
ception of Puerto Rico as a welfare state.
B. STATEHOOD
Supporters of the statehood option have long argued
that the commonwealth status is a transitional solution that
could lead to independence and the resultant loss of prized
American citizenship. Statehood is then an irrevocable way
of guaranteeing permanent citizenship for millions of Puerto
21Ricans. Puerto Rican statehood supporters have an ally in
President George Bush, who has expressed a preference for
granting statehood.
Statehood would bring additional benefits for Puerto
Rico. For example, Puerto Rico would have unique, exclusive
rights to seabed and natural resources within a 200-mile
radius.
Statehood advocates tend to minimize the potential
burden of the requirement to pay both federal and state
taxes by pointing out that this requirement would be delayed
for a few years. They also insist that the tax-paying
21. Henry Wells, The Modernization Of Puerto Rico, [Massachu-
setts: Harvard University Press, 19693, p. 245.
22. James J. Kilpatrick, "Puerto Rico: Unappealing Options", The
Monterey Herald, 16 August 19S9, p. 23.
25
capacity will equal that of other poor states after the
economy adjusts to increased investment and federal expendi-
tures. 23
There are certain political advantages to be considered
as well. Although Puerto Rico has managed to successfully
govern itself on a local basis, there is no significant
participation on the federal level. The statehood option
would correct this by providing Puerto Rico the opportunity
to not only continue electing its own governor and legisla-
ture, but also its share of United States senators and
proportionate representatives. In addition, Puerto Ricans
would also gain the right to vote in presidential elections
as full-fledged citizens.
Statehood, as opposed to commonwealth, may be seen as
the more desirable option to many in Washington because
Puerto Rico will require its citizens to start paying feder-
al income taxes after two years. Thus as author Pamela Falk
puts it, "By giving, we will provide more dignity to our
receiving.
Once again, the realities of a poor economic situa-
tion play a key role in making a particular option far less
23. Henry Wells, The Modemizat ion Of Puerto Rico, (Massachu-
setts: Harvard University Press, 1969), p. 246.
24. Pamela S. Falk, The Political Status Of Puerto Rico, (Massa-
chusetts: Americas Society, 1986), p. 16.
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attractive. The fact that Puerto Rico will become a source
for federal income taxes does not outweigh the reality
that statehood would cost the U.S. Treasury some $25 bil-
lion by the year 2000. This would be as a result of many
large companies leaving the island because of the elimina-
tion of special tax breaks. Consequently, unemployment
would double, more families would qualify for a greater
amount of federal aid, and the U.S. perception of Puerto
Rico as. a welfare state would be perpetuated.
The Congressional Budget Office confirmed that statehood
would increase the amount of federal aid to individuals from
$2 billion now to $5 billion by 1995. One-third of the
island s personal income would be derived from this source.
Por some there are also cultural factors that hinder
support for Puerto Rican statehood. After all, Puerto Rico
is by all intents and purposes a small, Latin American,
Spanish-speaking country, and historically, Latin America
and its culture have not been highly regarded by many North
Americans
.
Conversely, the use of Spanish as the official language
could prove to be a hopelessly contentious, political issue
where Puerto Ricans may be unwilling to compromise. This
unwillingness to compromise on the issue of language may be
costly for the United States as well. Federal courts would
25. Peter Passell, "Debate On Puerto Rico Rests On A Bottom
Line", A/eu' York Times, 15 May 1990.
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be granted the specie! privilege of having to conduct all
litigation proceedings in Spanish at the request of any
party. This produces the burden of dual record-keeping and
the hiring of court translators. Thus American officials
have avoided the issue because of its highly emotional
26nature and potential costs.**
C. INDEPENDENCE
There has always been a segment of the Puerto Rican
population involved in various degrees of independence
advocacy activities. In this present era of Soviet-East
bloc declarations of independence, it is conceivable that
international support would be on the side of permanent
Puerto Rican independence.
The establishment of a Republic of Puerto Rico is first
and foremost about the Nationalist's call to the right to
rejoin the Latin American political community in keeping
with their cultural affinity. Second it is about Puerto
Rico's need to end economic dependency on the United States.
Although independence would mean the eventual loss of
current financial benefits and unrestricted access to the
mainland, a sovereign Puerto Rico may use the Caribbean
:6. Jeffrey Schmal":, "With U.S. Help, Puerto Rico Seeks Its Own
Identity", New York Times, 10 July 1989, pp. Al and A9.
2S
Basin Initiative to retain some of those benefits, and thus
27avoid sn economic disaster.
The option of independence has some serious drawbacks
for the United States. The loss of Federal money may desta-
bilize the island with far-reaching consequences for the
region if borrowed Wall Street capital cannot be replaced.
Economic failure, coupled with radical anti-American leader-
ship 1 , could pave the way for civil war, or communist insur-
2£gent groups.
The Department of Defense (DOD) has the most reason for
concern ove r the independence option. Naval Station Roose-
velt Roads and radar installations are seen as vital U.S.
military assets that would be foolish to abandon. Although
DOD officials have couched the expression of the desire for
the United States to retain select military facilities in
Puerto Rico in diplomatic terms, there are indications that
base retention is. a national security issue where United
States' prerogatives will most likely prevail. Furthermore,
the language of the proposed bill states that "The Republic
of Puerto Rico shall be closed to any and all military
forces of foreign nations." Lastly, if the majority of
Puerto Ricans believed that independence loomed inevitably
ahead, such a stampede of immigration might ensue the likes
27. "Fudging The Facts On Puerto Rico", New York Times, 17
July 1989, p. A 14.
28. James J. KilPatrick, "Puerto Rico: Unappealing Options", The
Monterey HersId, 16 August 1989, p. 23.
of which would surpass the 40 percent of Puerto Rico's
population that has already emigrated to the United States
since 1945. 29
29. H. Michael Erisman, The Caribbean Challenge: U.S. Policy In
A Volitile Region, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1984), p. 191.
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IV. HISTORY OF ISSUE IN CONGRESS
A. FORAKER ACT
The following section explores the history of the issue
of Puerto Rico status, as debated in the U.S. Congress.
In 189S the United States acquired a Puerto Rican island
whose inhabitants had jubilantly welcomed the American
presence because of the prospects for American citizenship.
On July 25, 189£, General Nelson A. Miles, commanding offi-
cer of the American troops, had implied that the islanders
would soon be permanently and directly integrated into the
American political system.
This proclamation asserted that American forces,
"bearing the banner of freedom' , bore with them, the
fostering arm of a nation of free people, whose
greatest power is in justice and humanity to all
those living within its fold' and promised to "bestow
the immunities and blessings of the liberal institu-
tions of our Government ...[ and] the__ advantages and
blessings of enlightened civilization.'
The high expectations of the Puerto Ricans gradually
withered with the realization that in acquiring Puerto Rico,
the United States had no intention of granting either inde-
pendence or statehood. Instead, Puerto Rico's status, as
well as that of Guam and the Philippines, became an uncer-
tainty by virtue of the fact that the United States altered
the traditional purpose for territory acquisition.
>0. Jose A. Cabranes, Ci t izenship and the American Empire, (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1979), p. 19.
In the past, territories where seen as "embryonic
states that required nurturing to prepare them for full
statehood". An exception to Puerto Rico and the other
islands was made primarily for racial reasons. Therefore,
the islands became American possessions, without the tradi-
tional treaty provisions for citizenship or statehood.
In February of 1900, members of the House and Senate
debated the merits of various legislation that would culmi-
nate in the production of Puerto Rico's first organic polit-
ical statute. It is evident from the recorded comments
during the congressional debates that racism played a key
role in how Puerto Rico's status was defined. The Foraker
Act, adopted in April of 1900, granted the United States the
right to hold Puerto Rico as a colony, thus avoiding incor-
32poration and the granting of American citizenship. In
this case, legislation which was intended to resolve issues
of trade and commerce became linked to citizenship, race,
and the possible ramifications for the Philippine Islands.
Although the majority of House and Senate members fa-
vored the incorporation of Puerto Rico, they were convinced
that to do so would establish a precedent for the Philip-
pines. In other words, if Puerto Rico became an incorporated
31. Pamela S. Falk, The Pol it ical Status of Puerto Rico,
(.Massachusetts: Americas Society, 19S6), p. 4.
32. Jose Cabranes, Cit izenship and the American Empire,
Haven: Yale University Press, 1979), pp. 26-44.
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territory, then some members feared that a similar status,
with free trade provisions, would have to be given to the
Philippines. Therefore, members of congress debated Puerto
Rico's political status relative to the Philippines ques-
tion. Congressional rhetoric clearly reveals expressed
racism, fear, and loathing of the Filipino people. Perhaps
Senator Bates articulated this best when he said,
That some Filipinos were physically weaklings of low
stature, with black skin, ciosely curling hair-, flat
noses, thick lips., and large clumsy feet.' He doubted
that the precedent of 'expanding our authority once to
the Europeans living in Louisiana can be deemed as
sustaining the incorporation of millions of savages,
cannibals, Malays, Mohammedans, head hunters, and polyg-




As in the case of the Philippines, congressional policy
formulation for Puerto Rico was influenced by racial atti-
tudes, albeit "favorably" erroneous ones. Members of con-
gress tended to look with favor on Puerto Rico based on
dubious census reports concerning its racial composition.
The reports evidently misled Senator Payne into assuring
Congress that 'generally full-blooded white people, de-
scendants of the Spaniards, possibly mixed with some Indian
blood, but none of them of Negro extraction" outnumbered
33. Ibid, p. 40
nearly two to one the combined total of Negroes and mulat-
tos. ' Nevertheless, even those who believed that Puerto
Rico could benefit the United States economically and polit-
ically had reservations about the alleged racial composition
of the island. Men like Senator Depew did not want the
United States to go so far as to "incorporate the alien
races, and civilized, semi -c i vi 1 i zed , barbarous, and savage
peoples of these island into our body politic as states of
our union. ""'"'
The adoption of the Foraker Act therefore neither incor-
porated Puerto Rico, nor freed the United States from its
political obligation. Instead, Puerto Rico was given the
status of insular territory and possession of the United
States so as to avoid any possibility of moral or constitu-
tional obligation to incorporate the Philippines.
B. JONES ACT
In 1917 the United States Congress passed the Jones Act
which among other things, conferred American citizenship on
the Puerto Ricans. Once again, race played a role in the
altering of Puerto Rico's political status. The proposal for
the granting of citizenship garnered little opposition among
the members of Congress because it was apparent that the
34. Ibid, p. 31.
35. Ibid, p. 44.
36. Beth Donavan, "Islanders May Soon Decide Age-Old Status
Question", Congressional Quarterly, 15 July 1989, p. 1759,
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Philippines was well on its way to independence. In addi-
tion, World War I and the German threat to the Caribbean
made the conference of citizenship a matter of prudent
3 7security
.
As in the debate over the Foraker bill, race, culture
and geographic proximity were the dominant items of discus-
sion concerning the- Jones bill. Representative Towner, co-
founder of the Jones bill in the House, endorsed the bill by
stating that "nearly three-fourths of the population are
3 °
white, mostly of Spanish descent. Representative Huddles-
ton of Alabama noted that:
The people of Port Rico are of our race, they are
people who inherit an old civilization - a civilization
which may be fairly compared to our own.
While the majority of congressmen favored the granting
of American citizenship on the basis of the alleged racial
similarity, some were equally bent on limiting the bound-
aries of that status so as not to grant statehood to a
people whom they believed to be were racially dissimilar .
37. Jorge Heine, Time for Decision, (Lanham, Maryland: North-
South Publishing Co., 1976) p. 216.
38. Jose Carbranes, C it izenship and the American Empire, (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1979) p. 82.
39. Between 1900 and 1932, Puerto Rico was officially misspelled
as "Porto Rico" - a result of a spelling error in English version
of the Treaty of Paris. Treaty of Paris, December 10, 1898,
United States-Spain, 30 Stat. 1756, T.S. no 343. This incorrect
spelling was formally used first in the formulation of the Forak-
er Act. Foraker Act (Puerto Rico), ch. 191, 31 Stat. 77 (1900).
40. Cabranes, Citizenship and the American Empire, p. 83.
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Representative Joseph Connon of I 1 1 inois , . . . who believed
that the people of Port Rico have not the slightest
conception of self-government, opposed the citizenship
idea for a variety of reasons, mostly racial. He was
evidently unpersuaded by the general characterizations
of the Puerto Ricans as a largely white people. Noting
that he had visited Puerto Rico three times, he informed
the House that Porto Rico is populated by a mixed race.
About 30 percent of the population are pure
African. .
.
[and fully] 75 to 80 percent of the popula-
tion... was pure African or had an African strain in
their blood/ 1
Connon" s ideal status for Puerto Rico was similar to
what the Foraker Act had established.
God forbid, he asserted to the recorded applause of his
colleagues, that in his time or mine, there should be




Thus, while Congress supported the passage of the Jones
Act which resulted in the conference of American citizenship
on the Puerto Ricans, they did so as an act of ensuring
national security stemming from concern over the German
presence in the Caribbean. The new status did very little




The advent of the Cold War precipitated a substantive
change in the political status of Puerto Rico. In 1950,
urged on by President Truman, Congress set in motion the
political process that would produce the Estado Libre Aso-
41. Ibid, p. 90.
42. Ibid, p. 90.
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ciado. "Commonwealth," was adopted as the English translation
of the Spanish phrase, Estado Libre Asociado as to avoid the
suggestion to Congress that Puerto Rico was to become a
state as the translation, "Free Associated State" would tend
to imply.
Thus, when the Commonwealth Constitution of Puerto Rico
was inaugurated on the island on July 25, 1952, it marked
a significant achievement for supporters of the commonwealth
status. However, the debate over Puerto Rico's status contin-
ued even after the adoption of the Commonwealth Constitu-
tion, because once again, there was little change in the
United States-Puerto Rican relationship as set forth in the
Foraker Act. This prompted the United States to establish a
joint commission to further study the status question.
1. 1967 Plebiscite
As a result of this commission, an island plebi-
scite was held in 1967 in which the majority vote from among
the choices of independence, statehood, or continued common-
wealth status was cast in favor of the status quo. [see
table 1.1]
43. U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Interior and Insular
Af fairs, Puerto Rico Self-Determination Act, Report prepared
by Congressman Udall, 101st Cong., 2d sess., 199D, Rept
,
101-790, part 1, p. 8.
44. Pamela S. Falk, The Political Status of Puerto Rico, (Massa-
chusetts: Americas Society, 1986) p. 4.
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Source: Adapted from U.S. Congress. House. Report on Puerto
Rico Self-Determination Act, 101st Congress, 2d sess., H.R.
101-790, part one, p. 11.
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To this day the issue remains unresolved due to contro-
versy surrounding the plebiscite. First, the independence
advocates boycotted the plebiscite for several reasons,
mainly because of the United States presence and failure to
transfer power to the island prior to the vote. Second,
despite the overwhelming vote for continued commonwealth
status, the independence advocates claimed that abstentions
were really votes for independence.
Furthermore, even though both statehood and common-
wealth supporters agreed that the outcome of the vote meant
that the Puerto Rican people were squarely in favor of
continuing their connection with the United States, they
claimed that Governor Marin deliberately misrepresented the
meaning of commonwealth to the people and took advantage of
his popularity to do it.
Ultimately, it was the ambiguity of the status
options as they appeared on the ballot that became the
central issue. Hence, the legitimacy of the Commonwealth
continues to arouse uncertainty.
2. Ad Hoc Advisory Groups
Between the adoption of the commonwealth status and
the current congressional action, there have been other
studies and recommendations for political change in Puerto
Rico. Although these studies were jointly sponsored by the
45. Pamela S. Falk, The Political Status Of Puerto Rico, (Massa-
chusetts: Americas Society, 1986), pp. 176-177.
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President and the Governor of Puerto Rico, Congress has
consistently failed to implement the recommendations. In
1970, an advisory group formed to study the possibility of
granting Puerto Ricans the right to vote in U.S. presiden-
tial elections. The final recommendation was that Puerto
Ricans should be granted the right to vote, and that a
plebiscite on that issue should be held as soon as possible.
To date, this plebiscite has never been held. Another group
studied the United States-Puerto Rico relationship, and
recommended increased autonomy for the island government.
In 1975, a bill to implement the recommendation was intro-
duced into Congress, but the bill died when Congress ad-
journed in 1976.
46. Roland I. Perusse, The United States and Puerto Rico,
[London: University Press of America 1987), p. 2.
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V. CURRENT PROCESS
The following section examines the cunrent legislative
pnocess on the Puerto Rican status question. Clearly,
the status question has dominated Puerto Rican politics for
decades. In fact, once Puerto Rico adopts a permanent sta-
tus, the major rallying cause for the three major island
political parties will cease to exist. Despite the issue's
consistent staying power in the forefront of Puerto Rican
politics, it took the amalgamation of a number of political
factors, both on the island and in the States, to inspire
Congress to get another round of Puerto Rican status legis-
lation going. For example, in the November 19S8 gubernatori-
al race, Puerto Rico's Governor Rafeal Hernandez Colon, an
active supporter of the commonwealth status, barely hedged a
re-election defeat by his pro-statehood opponent. This in
itself did not signify a change in the popularity of the
current status, but the fact that it was the fourth consecu-
tive election where no candidate captured a majority of the
votes, was enough for Governor Colon to signify his inten-
tion to resolve the issue once and for all.
For the first time, the leadership from all of the major
Puerto Rican political parties agreed that it was time to
make a concerted effort to produce a plebiscite for the
47. Beth Donovan, "Islanders May Soon Decide Age-Old Status
Question", Congressional Quarterly, 1989, p. 1759.
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island where once and for all, statehood, independence or
an enhanced commonwealth status could be chosen.
Although Puerto Rico has the authority to hold a refer-
endum, independent of the United States, party leaders
learned from the 1967 experience that Congress does not
necessarily feel obligated to implement the results of a
domest ical 1 y- ini t iat ed referendum. ' Party leaders recog-
nized that in order to have a binding plebiscite outcome,
and one that the United States would commit to act on, it
was absolutely crucial to gain the support of the United
States government. Their letter, which solicited the sup-
port of the United States President and Congress, was indi-
rectly answered when President Bush urged Congress to initi-
ate the legislative process that would produce a plebiscite.
President Bush's public support for Puerto Rico's right
to choose is not at all unusual. Every President since
Eisenhower has advocated self-determination without having
to face the reality of Congress actually passing legislation
that would significantly disturb the status quo. Committee
Chairman J. Bennett Johnston and James A. McClure appeared
48. Ibid, 1759,
49. U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Interior and Insular
Affairs, "Puerto Rico Self -Determinat ion Act", report
prepared by Congressman Udall, 101st Cong., sd sess., 1990,
Rept, 101-790, part 1, p. 12.
50. Tom Wicker, "America's Captive Nation", New York Times, 22
February, 1991.
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to be bent on doing just that. First, Senator Johnston made
reference to his belief that the people of Puerto Rico were
American citizens who deserved to choose their status in a
plebiscite, and then he and Senator McClure consulted the
leaders of the major Puerto Rican parties to gain their
input
.
Although some Congressmen clearly have parochial inter-
ests, these early actions seem to indicate that, among other
things, a sense of fairness motivated Chairman Johnston's
desire to spearhead the legislation. For example, states
such as New Jersey can boast of having large, profitable
pharmaceutical companies whose branch factories located in
Puerto Rico benefit enormously from the federal tax exemp-
tion~'*~ associated with section 936 of the Internal Revenue
Code, under the commonwealth status. On the other hand,
Senator Johnston's interest is rooted in his long-time
experience in Puerto Rican issues. In 1973 he served as the
chairman of the Interior Subcommittee on the Territories,
and in the mid-1970s he was a member of the congressional Ad
Hoc Advisory Group on Puerto Rico. In addition, he is well
53respected in Puerto Rico for his concern for the island.
51. Beth Donovan, "Islander May Soon Decide Age-Old Status Ques-
tion", Congressional Quarterly, pp. 1759-1760.
52. Kelly Dumas, "Working Through Recess", Congressional Quarter-
ly, 8 December 1990, p. 4076.
53. Ibid, p. 4076.
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Predictably, there were a myriad of factors that indi-
cated that some support of the legislative process was
solely for the achievement of other agendas; some discreet,
others clearly articulated. As was the case with the Foraker
Act and the Jones Bill, the pursuit of these independent
agendas resulted in the loss of any significant challenge to
the current status quo.
A plebiscite bill was not passed for a number of reasons
such as
:
(a) republican desire to gain Hispanic members for the
GOP while intending to maintain the status quo, regardless
of a possible winning vote for statehood;
(b) resistance to the concept of a culturally Hispanic-
state ;
(c) enormous costs associated with the statehood op-
t ion ;
(d) complexity of the legislative process; and
(e) partisan politics.
A. SENATE BILLS
The legislative process led next to the drafting of
three referendum bills in the Senate: S710, S711, and S712.
S710 is a proposition for a Puerto Rican referendum, without
elaboration on the details. Senate bill 711 outlines general
principles, but no specifics. S710, Johnston's and McClure's
preferred bill, is a sel f -execut ing bill that would commit
the United States government to automatically implement the
44
chosen status under detailed procedures. On April 5, 1989,
S712 was introduced to the Senate.
B. HOUSE BILL
In contrast to the Senate, on May 9, 1990, the House
Interior and Insular Affairs subcommittee, produced
HR4765, a bill very different from S712. HR4765, introduced
by Delegate Ron de Lugo of the Virgin Islands, directed the
House Interior and the Senate Energy Committees to draft
implementation bills for the chosen status, subsequent to
the referendum. The House bill is known as the "Puerto Rico
ii 5 cSelf -De t erminat ion Act".
The House referendum bill passed unanimously on the
floor, and although; S712 moved through the Committee on
Energy and Natural Resources, snd Senate Committees on
Finance, Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry, it failed to
reach the floor to be voted on before the 101st Congress
adjourned, thus effectively deflating Puerto Rican hopes for
a plebiscite before the island's political elections in
1992. 56
54. U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Interior and Insular
Affairs, Puerto Rico Se 1 f-Determinat ion Act, report pre-
pared by Congressman Udall, 101st Cong., 2d sess. , 1990,
Rept, 101-790, part 1 p. 1.
55. Ibid, part 2, p. 1-3




There exist a variety of logical reasons for Congress's
failure to pass Puerto Rican status legislation. The
complexity of the process, race and culture, partisan
politics, and cost were all significantly negative factors.
Eut , as in the past, reasons against change most often serve
to conveniently mask the irresistible political attractive-
ness of preserving the status quo in reaction to the threat
of real political status change. This situation is being
perpetuated by non-consensus among Puerto Ricans, and most
notably from the most vocal sector: Puerto Rican status
lobbyists
.
In the case of the 101st Congress, the statehood option
triggered the most status legislation opposition. Despite
efforts to draft "revenue-neutral" and preferential-free
legislation, it became apparent that the statehood movement
was gathering strength and momentum on a variety of fronts.
First, more Puerto Ricans than ever before have expressed a
preference for statehood. A public opinion poll taken in
January of 1989 showed that commonwealth was preferred 52
percent as opposed to 41 percent for statehood. However, a
poll taken in late 1990 showed as much as 48 percent of the
46
57island population favored st at ehood . " According to some
island polls, statehood is attracting more supporters.
Second, statehood supporters have the outspoken support of
President Bush, and given that the House-approved measure
was soundly endorsed by leaders of the three major Puerto
Rican political parties, it made statehood more attainable
then ever before. Lastly, S712 became somewhat controversial
in that some members of Congress believed that the bill
expressed a clear and influential preference for the costly
statehood option; therefore, support for the bill was
considerably weakened.
Thus there is a direct link between the perceived edge
and preference for the statehood option, and the instinctive
congressional status quo reaction that led to the demise of
the plebiscite bill. Partisan politics provide just one
example of why this was so.
What, then, are the key issues in the legislative proc-
ess defining Puerto Rico' status? The following section will
analyze these factors: partisan politics; complexity of
process; culture and race; and cost.
57. Kitty Dumas, "Practice Makes Puerto Rico a Porce Heard In
Congress" Congressional Quarterly 8 December 1990, p. 4078.
5S. Kitty Dumas, "Measure On Puerto Rico's Status Hits Snags in
Both Chambers" , Congressional Quarterly, 4 August 1990.
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A. PARTISAN POLITICS
While Republicans traditionally have been staunch sup
porters of statehood, many congressional Republicans have
reservations that may have allowed other motives to supersede
the stated official position.
The Republican National Committee has been accused of
trying to pry Hispanics from their traditional loyalty to
59the Democratic Party. Accoramg to one aide, other Demo-
crats have implied that President Bush made statehood an
issue to garner Puerto Rican support, knowing that a Demo-
cratically controlled Congress "will never agree to that'
this session. Hence, the appeal for Puerto Rican statehood
may merely facilitate the GOP's strategy for winning Hispan-
ic votes. The Hispanic vote is increasingly important in
Florida, Texas, California and several other states, and
many Hispanics have already been attracted to the Republi-
cans' tough anti-communist stance.
Oddly enough, S712 came under fire from Democrats and.
Republicans because the bill's language allegedly favored
statehood. Republicans may have feared that a Puerto Rican
state would result in two Democratic Senators and as many as
59. Laurence I Barrett, "Puerto Rico, The 51st Estado", Time, 26
March 1990, p. 19.
60. Eeth Donovan, "Islanders May Soon Decide Age-Old Status
Question", Congressional Quarterly, p. 1761.
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five Democratic Representatives in Congress. On the other-
hand, Democrats are traditionally allied with the Popular
Democratic Party, the pro-commonwealth party currently in
control of most Puerto Rican elective offices. Democrats
fear the loss of the tax-exempt status for U.S. businesses,
should the statehood option win. Therefore, Democrats have
been somewhat reluctant to support the bill.
Democrat and Republican Congressmen alike proved unable
to ley aside well-established, traditional loyalties in
favor of cooperation in producing referendum legislation.
B. COMPLEXITY OP PROCESS
If there were no other factors working against the
passage of a status bill in the House and Senate, the sheer
complexity involving the legislative process alone would be
enough to stymie congressional action. Early on, Delegate
De Lugo warned that "We in Congress can only go so far in
our efforts to obtain a fair bill which we believe could be
enacted. The nature of this process, given its level of
difficulty and sensitivity, is that any party who wishes can
torpedo the bill." 62
Perhaps Chairman Johnston's haste to get the bill out on
the floor, thus hoping to avoid complicating the process,
61. Martin Tolchin, "Election On Puerto Rico's Future May Be Two
Years Off, Senators Say", New York Times, 31 January 1991.
62. Kitty Dumas, "Measure On Puerto Rico's Status Hits Snags In
Both Chambers", Congtressional Quarterly, <+ August 1990, p.
2506.
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achieved precisely the opposite effect. Most Congressmen,
regardless of their inclination, had questions concerning
the costs of the statehood and independence options. Others
wanted to first settle the controversy on just who would be
allowed to vote in the plebiscite. Still others opposed the
one thing that Puerto Rican leaders realized was a necessity
from the very beginning: obtaining a guarantee that Congress
would be bound to implement the status outcome. Several
Senators articulated that the pace of legislative action
was much too fast for an issue fraught with so many complex
implications and political obstacles.
Puerto Rican political parties also complicated the
process. The pro-commonwealth Popular Democratic Party
[PDPJ, and the pro-statehood New Progressive Party (NPP)
both employed powerful and dogmatic lobbyists who were tasked
with gaining the upper hand in the legislative process.
Unfortunately, the lobbyist machines only contributed to the
political deadlock. ""When you have SO lobbyists, it's hard
to get anything done,' said Allen Stayman, an aide to John-
st on
.
In the end, the House passed the referendum bill, HR
4765, but the legislation process died in the Senate when
63. Beth Donovan, "Senators Debate Cost To U.S. Of Puerto Rican
Statehood", Congressional Quarterly, 29 July 1989, p. 1955.
64. Kelly Dumas, "Practise Makes Puerto Rico A Force Heard In
Congress", Congressional Quarterly, 8 December 1990, p.
4074 .
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Johnston declared that the Senate version was too fundamen-
tally different from the House bill for a compromise to be
worked out in the remaining 101st Congress session. Chairman
Johnston's refusal to act on the House bill seriously dam-
aged his appearance of altruistic commitment to resolving
the status question, given that leaders from all three
Puerto Ricari parties, had pleaded with Johnston to accept the
6 5
no n- binding House bill.
Thus far, the legislation process has fared no better
with the 102nd Congress. Chairman Johnston had removed the
S712's se If -execut ing provision, but this significant alter-
ation was not enough to make the bill any more appealing to
Republicans. Therefore, the House Republicans failed to
endorse the issue. The lack of consensus in the House and
Senate means that not only will the Puerto Ricans not have a
referendum in 1991, but that it will probably have to wait
until 1993 because there is a general agreement that a
referendum should not be held in 1992, when Puerto Rico
holds general elections.
C. CULTURE AND RACE
If there are hindering factors that have historically
played a recurring role in how Puerto Rico's status has been
shaped, it would be race and culture. Beneath the obviously
65. Kelly Dumas, "Working Through Recess", Congressional Quar-
terly, p. 4076.
66. Bill McAllister, "Puerto Rico's Political Leaders Urge
Referendum", Washington Post, 31 January 1991.
political reasons for the legislation's failure lurks the
possibility that the measure was not supported for reasons
of race and culture.
After all, says Don Nickles, an Oklahoma
Republ ican, Puerto Ricans might not "blend" with the U.S.
if they chose statehood. Exactly, says Wendell Ford, a
Kentucky Democrat, who describes Puerto Rico as that
sinister thing, a separate culture. Malcom Wallop,
Republican from Wyoming is all for letting Puerto Ricans
hold a referendum as long as Congress can ignore the
,, ..67resul t s
.
Although Puerto Ricans have bravely fought in all Ameri-
can wars since WWII, some Senators seem to suggest that
Puerto Rico would not fit into the Union because of Puerto
Rican nationalist sentiments. Senate Majority Whip, Wendell
H. Pord said that, "Nationalism cannot be stamped out... It
can be suppressed, in my opinion, for the moment, but it is
4. - • . 68going to rise again.
In addition, some Republicans are unhappy with the pros-
pect of having a state that has Spanish as the official
language. Their fears are not groundless as the Puerto Rican
House of Representatives had already passed a "Spanish only"
69bill in October of 1990. In addition, some 5S percent of
67. "New York Times Editorial Supports Puerto Rico Plebiscite",
Congressional Record, 26 February 1991, E627.
63. J. Jennings Moss, "Senators Leery of Puerto Rico as 51st
State", t-Jashi ington Times, 21 February 1991.
69. Bill McAllister, "Puerto Rico Statehood Movement Gains",
Mashington Post, 27 December 1990.
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the population are unable to speak English. A few senators
such as Senator Kent Conrad from North Dakota argued that
they would not vote for statehood because Puerto Rico's
Hispanic culture, mixed with statehood, would lead to a
situation similar to Canada, where French-speaking Quebec
has become a divisive issue among Canadians.
Although Puerto Rico's Hispanic culture was rightly
given general consideration in Congress, it appears that a




Uithout doubt, no single issue affected the failed
outcome of the legislation effort more than cost. Again,
this is so because of the enormous costs associated with
statehood. Given that the expensive statehood option ap-
peared to have not only the lead in preference, but a slant
in the language of S712 as well, Democrats and Republicans
alike had reason to lose enthusiasm for the bill.
According to the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), if
Puerto Rico were to become a state, over 9.4 billion addi-
tional dollars would be required during the first four years
to cover the cost of new social entitlements. Puerto Rico's
per capita income in 19SS was $5,673 - half of Mississippi's
70. Congressional Record - Senate, 21 February 1991, p. S2076
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which is the poorest state in the Union. Presently, more
than half of the island's population lives below the nation-
al property line, thus accounting for the dramatic increase
72in federal spending.
Although the Energy and Natural Resources Committee
predicted that between 1992 and 1995, the government would
gain a total of $1.2 billion in new tax revenue, and by
2000, $18.8 billion, some members of Congress argue that
there are no reliable estimates, particularly because one of
the unresolved controversies centers around the proposal to
only gradually phase in income tax requirements for Puerto
Rico
.
As each state in the Union faces more stringent budget
constraints, Congressmen are forced to put the priority for
spending funds in their respective states. Senator Paul
Simon of Illinois said it best when he said, "1 have helped
the Puerto Ricans some, but obviously my major responsibili-
ty is to the people of Illinois.'
Under commonwealth, Puerto Rico's economic growth is
projected at an annual rate of 2.5 to 4 percent. This is
71. Eill McAllister, "Puerto Rico Statehood Movement Gains",
Uashingiton Post, 27 December 1990.
72. Beth Donovan, "Potential Cost of Statehood Par Exceeds Other
Options", Congressional Quarterly, IS November 1989, p.
3152.
73. Ibid.
74. "Commonwealth Status Por Puerto Rico: Repackaged Colonial-
ism, Congressional Record, 14 March 1991, p. 3462.
54
significant because F'uerto Rico buys, more goods from the
mainland than Argentina, Brazil, Chile, plus Colombia com-
bined. Senator John D. Rockefeller IV, a Democrat from
West Virginia articulated his concerns about Puerto Rico's
status change and its potential to negatively affect other
areas of the U.S. economy. "I am unable to separate the
representation of my state from the consideration of this
amendment", Rockefeller said.
Democrats who favor the commonwealth status have a host
of economic arguments against statehood for Puerto Rico.
Hence the status quo is particularly appealing to them. For
example, they argue that the loss of Section 936 would spell
economic disaster for the island. They maintain that 100,000
jobs would be lost over the next ten years, causing the
77unemployment rate, now at 14.4 percent, to soar. In addi-
tion, a Peat flarwick study concluded that 72 percent of the
American companies that have put some 2,000 industrial
Plants on the island would leave, resulting in the loss of
80,000 to 145,000 jobs. Furthermore, a CEO report stated
75. Tom Wicker, "The 51st State?", New YOrk Times, 9 February
1991.
76. Kelly Dumas, "Measure On Puerto Rico's Status Hits Snags In
Both Chambers", Congressional Quarterly, p. 2506.
77. James J. Kilpatrick "Defeat Bills That Support Statehood For
Puerto Rico", Miami Herald, 30 August 1990.
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The combination of staggering economic costs for state-
hood and shrinking state budgets naturally lessened congres-
sional commitment to the passage of a plebiscite bill,
particularly one that was self -execut ing and outcome-binding
In summary, it comes as no surprise that this most
recent attempt to provide the Puerto Rican people with an
opportunity to permanently decide the island's status met
with failure. Since 1900, Congress has enacted legislation
to determine Puerto Pico's status on a basis other than
Puerto Rico's right to self-determination. From the Foraker
Act, to the Commonwealth Constitution of 1952, and now in
these most recent attempts, to resolve the status question,
American political interests have hindered Congress's abili-
ty to honestly commit to allowing Puerto Ricans to resolve
the status question. The primary reason for this is that
Congress has a tendency to allow outside factors to lead it
into opting for the status quo.
A variety of factors contributed to the latest referen-
dum legislation failure. In this case, partisan politics,
complexity of the legislative process, and culture all
played key roles in this regard. However, it was the cost
factor associated with the statehood option, and the accom-




panying vision of Puerto Rico as a welfare state that most
strongly doomed the legislative effort.
VII. IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY VIS-A-VIS PUERTO RICO
It is unknown, at this time, what the future status of
Puerto Rico will be, but it is likely that Puerto Ricans
will have an opportunity to choose between statehood, inde-
pendence, or enhanced commonwealth. This section will exam-
ine the impl icat ions for U.S. policy vis-a-vis Puerto Rico
in the military, international, economic, political, drug
war, and terrorism fields.
Puerto Ricans have already experienced something to this
effect with respect to the 1967 plebiscite. The difference
between the 1967 plebiscite and one that will be held in the
future is that this time, Congress will likely bind itself
to implementing the outcome.
Therefore, conventional wisdom supports both the need for
identifying areas that are important to U.S. national inter-
ests in P'uerto Rico, and discerning the potential impact of
each status on U.S. interests.
A. MILITARY
The fundamental importance of U.S. bases in Puerto Rico
rests in the durability of the principles set forth in the
Monroe Doctrine of 1823. President James Monroe had declared
that there was to be a clear distinction between the old
countries under European purview and the New World that lay
in close geographic proximity to the United States. European
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encroachment and threats to the new republics in Latin
America would be viewed as threats to the United States.
Today, just as then, United States' goals of hemispheric
sovereignty still very much drive U.S. na-tional security
interests in the Caribbean and in Latin America.
Military facilities in Puerto Rico can and have been
used to fulfill defense requirements in terms of regional or
global conflicts. Although the recent reduction of Cold War
hostilities between the United States and the Soviet Union
necessitates a major re-assessment of the threat at the very
least, Caribbean and Latin American security contingencies
continue to require a proximate, ready, well-trained U.S.
military presence. A sizable portion of the U.S. military
response relies upon six viable military installations
situated on over 48,000 acres of Puerto Rico's real estate.
[see table 2.1]
Despite the new U.S. foreign policy emphasis on "part-
nership", and although U.S. strategy operates primarily in
the preventative and anticipatory mode, there remains a
79rationale for using military force against threats. ' Thus
the possible loss of bases in Puerto Rico could have a
negative impact upon the United State's capability to re-
spond to challenges to its goals in the region by limiting
either the United States' capacity for independent action or
79. David Ronfelat, "Geopolitics, Security, arid U.S. Strategy in
the Caribbean Basin", Technical Report, 27 April 1984. p. v
F.9
TABLE 2. 1 MILITARY BASES AND INSTALLATIONS
Installat ion Location Acres
Navy :




















Source: U.S. General Accounting Office, Puerto Rico: Infor-
mation for Status Del iberat ions, p. 40, Government Account-
ing Office, Washington, DC, 1990.
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constraining the United States within the bounds of inade-
quate in-country facilities.
1. Caribbean Security
The usefulness of U.S. bases in the Caribbean has
already been historically proven. Specifically for Puerto
Rico, bases for ships and aircraft were established at San
Juan to prevent German entry into the Caribbean during World
War II. In addition, the tiny Puerto Rican islands of
Vieques and Culebra were used for amphibious landings and
80target practice. Although the grand plans for providing
anchorage, docking, repair facilities, fuel and supplies for
the Atlantic Fleet where put on hold until after the end of
World War II, U . S . military bases in Puerto Rico continued
to be tied to a Caribbean policy that
had protection of the Caribbean Basin as the "continental
"SIbackyard of the United States as its primary theme.
During the Cold War era, U.S. Naval Station Roosevelt
Roads became the primary protectorate base for the Carib-
bean and the center for guided missile operations for the
Atlantic Fleet. Ey 1957 the dredging of the harbor was
completed, airfield runways were extended, and a missile
SO. Paolo E. Coletta, ed. United States Navy and Marine Corps
Bases, Domestic, (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1985) p. xiii
81. David Ronfeldt, "Geopolitics, Security, and U.S. Strategy in
the Caribbean Basin", Technical Report, 27 April 1985, p. 77
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82launching pad was built. In 1965, Roosevelt Roads had an
opportunity to influence Caribbean events when it played an
important role in the Dominican Republic intervention.
Roosevelt Roads was also vital to combating the Soviet
threat in the Cold War era. In 1980 Vice Adm. G.E.R. Kin-
near II testified at a House of Representatives' Armed
Services- Committee meeting and made the following comments:
The essential element that provides the U.S. Navy
its advantage over the Soviets is our ability to deploy
high performance aircraft; that is carrier aviation.
They have us outnumbered in submarines and surface
ships. Only in the area of high performance aircraft at
sea do we have the edge... The Roosevelt Roads total
training complex, of which Vieques is and integral part,




The significance of military bases in Puerto Rico in the
current post Cold War era is being shaped by the uncertain-
ties of future events. For example, naval forces arid assets
from Roosevelt Roads were an integral component of the U.S.
Forces Caribbean located at Key West, Florida. A two-star
admiral directed the Forces' many missions that included
coordinating and conducting operations in the Caribbean in
support of national objectives from emergencies, natural
disasters, to limited war, or general war. This entity is
82. Paolo E. Coletta, ed. , United States Navy and Marine Corps
Bases, Overseas (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1985) p. 273.
S3. Ibid.
, p. 274
£4. Guy F. Abbate, Jr. "Homeporting a Destroyer Squadron at
Roosevelt Roads, Puerto Rice", Technical Report, 18 July
1986. p 20.
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now defunct as of 1 July 1989. Yet there remsin strong
reasons for believing that military facilities in Puerto
Rico have by no means outlived their role in United States
national security, despite the declining Soviet threat.
For example, loss of military installations in Panama and
Guantanamo Bay (Cuba) by the year 2000 may dramatically
increase the significance of bases in Puerto Rico. Reopening
Ramey Air Force Ease in Puerto Rico will again give the U.S.
an operational air base located south of Texas, should
Howard Air Force Base in Panama close. In addition, Roose-
velt Roads will pla/ a crucial role in protecting the sea
lanes between the Venezuelan oil fields and Gulf Coast
ref i ner i es
.
If the majority vote is cast in favor of statehood or
commonwealth, then Roosevelt Roads can be further enhanced
by the relative freedom to choose to homeport a multi-pur-
pose squadron of destroyers or frigates. In addition, Roose-
velt Roads will be useful in protecting Atlantic sea routes
that are used by oil tankers too large to sail the Suez.
The following specific scenarios show how a particular
challenge may require a Puerto Rico-based military response:
(a) Sabotage of the Panama Canal or political instability
in the Caribbean touches off tensions; and
85. Ibid, p. 27d
(b) Special Forces that receive training at Naval Sta-
tion Roosevelt Roads retrieve U.S. citizens held by
revolutionaries or terrorists. b
The United States has had recent, real-life opportunity
to prove the utility of the training environment provided at
Roosevelt Roads. For example, in 1989, Commander of Carib-
bean naval forces, William O'Connors, explained how the
carriers Coral Sea and America utilized Roosevelt Roads to
practice nocturnal radar-guided bombing maneuvers. These
maneuvers were used to deal effective blows to Libya in 1986
and to Iraq during the recent Gulf crisis. In addition,
aircraft from the carrier Saratoga intercepted a commercial
flight carrying the participants in the hijacking of the
Achi 1 le Lauro. The Saratoga had also utilized the training
areas at Roosevelt Roads.
^
Department of Defense officials have expressed their
concern over the possible loss of bases in the Caribbean
under an independent Puerto Rico. They maintain that regard-
less of the option chosen, there sre certain facilities that
merit retention for their national security value and that
the current military presence is vital to strategic defense.
86. Regina Brzozowski, "Puerto Rico: Views on Status Alterna-
tives", The Times of the Americas, 26 July, 1989, p. 5.
£7. Victor Rodriguez, "Democracy and Decolonization", Interna-
tional Report V. 9, No. 2, July 1991, p. 3.
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The list of vital facilities is as follows:
(a) Roosevelt Roads Naval complex;
(b) Vieques Island;
(c) Naval Security Group, Sabana Seca
;
(d) Punts Borinquen radar site (CBRN);
(e) Punta Salinas radar site (CBRN);
(f) San Juan International Airport /Munis Air National Guard
Base ;
(g) Borinquen Field access; and
(h) Camp Santiago.
Puerto Rico is not merely an island whose location
holds strategic value for U.S. forces. Indeed, military
facilities in Puerto Rico offer training for and enhance the
readiness of the Atlantic Fleet as no other East Coast
military facility can do. Bigadier General M.J. Byron,
Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary Of Defense testified
before the Senate Committee On Energy And Natural Resources
on July 11, 1989. He argued that there were "...no suitable
options available for an alternate site that allows the
breadth of integrated training required."
Currently Roosevelt Roads hosts four major military
exercises annually. All weapons systems of the Atlantic
Fleet Weapons Range are tested during the Navy's wintertime
maneuver known as Operation Springboard. Operation Rimex is
a multi-ship exercise to train and test units in weapons
systems. Operation Storm Fury is held to monitor tropical
(- =.
storms. Lastly, Roosevelt Roads coordinates a large Marine
Corps exercise, Operation Firex.
In addition to the training exercises conducted at
Roosevelt Roads, is the drill conducted at Camp Santiago,
Exercise Tradewinds.
Between August and October of 1981, the Puerto Rican
island of Vieques was the site of the largest naval exercise
by the U.S. since World War II. The following November the
DOD upgraded its regional defense network., which includes
the Antilles Defense Command in Puerto Rico< to command
status. Its areas of responsibility include Caribbean
waters and islands, Gulf of Mexico, and parts of the Pacific
bordering Central and South America.
In addition to the capability of military bases in Puerto
Rico to cover a broad range of mission possibilities in and
around the Caribbean Basin, their very presence provides a
visible and stabilizing force for other island nations. The
result will have an effect of heightening Basin leaders'
perceived U.S. commitment to preserving Caribbean political
and military security. Thus the importance of military bases
88. Paolo E Coletta, United States Navy and Marine Corps Bases,
Overseas, (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1985) p. 273
89. Sandra U) . Meditz and Dennis M. Hanratty, Islands of the
Commonwealth Caribbean; a regional study, (Washington D.C.:
Federal Reserve Division of the Library of Congress, 1989),
P. 598.
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The war on drugs involves more than just the countries
of Latin America. Although most Caribbean countries do not
produce a significant amount of illegal drugs, they are
often used as transshipment points by Andean countries.
The drug trade and its corrupting influence threaten
political and economic stability in the region. Not only is
the- insidious consumer drug market in the United States
being fed by shipments from Mexico, Colombia, and other
Latin American countries, but also from the Caribbean Basin.
The United States insular areas constitute the Caribbean and
Pacific borders for the United States. These borders have
the least amount of protection and are being used to trans-
ship lethal drugs to the United States mainland.
The U.S. military, specifically the sophisticated
radar sites in Puerto Rico, may be asked to take on an
increased role in drug interdiction. There is evidence to
suggest that drug smuggling organisations that specialize in
ferrying cocaine and marijuana from Barranqui 1 la , Colombia
to Puerto Rico, and then on to Miami for distribution are on
on
the rise. Thus the numerous radar sites located in Puerto
Rico, and the support that the communications facilities
90. Mike McQueen, "Puerto Rico's Drug Queen Held in Miami",
Nismi Herald, 11 May 1990.
provide, are an integral part of the overall Caribbean Basin
Radar Network (CBRNK
Military radar sites in Puerto Rico are not the only
tools being utilized in drug interdiction efforts. Various
local agencies have dedicated substantial resources for not
only thwarting the arrival of drugs from Puerto Rico to the
U.S. mainland, but for combating a serious domestic drug
epidemic. Puerto Rican officials have an irresistible reason
for- dedicating valuable time and effort to interdicting
drugs. The island is being ravaged by Acquired Immune
Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) spread about by intravenous drug
use .
In 1986, the United Forces for Rapid Action against Drug
Trafficking (FURA) w^s formed to execute the majority of the
island's law enforcement plans. The agency also coordinates
local agencies with federal agencies such as the Federal
Bureau of Investigations, the Coast Guard, and Drug Enforce-
Q 1
ment Administration. In addition, in 1986 the U.S. Con-
gress allocated $7.8 million dollars to Puerto Rico for the
purchase of drug interdiction aircraft, vehicles, and other
equipment under Ant i Drug Abuse Act. In its first year,
FURA seized over $1 billion dollars worth of drugs. In
early 198S, FURA seized $42,500,000,000 in drugs. 92 Lastly,
91. Congress, House, Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs,
Implementet ion and Amendment s to the Insular Areas Dru& Abuse
Act, 100th Cong., 2nd sess., 16 June 1983, pp. 28-29.
92. Ibid, p. 23
^P.
Puerto Rican officials have successfully captured narcotics-
traffickers. For example, Arturo Durazo Moreno, former Chief
of Police in Mexico City and corrupt trafficker was arrested
93in Puerto Rico and extradited.
B. POLITICAL
Puerto Rico's importance to the United States is more
difficult to define.. There has ne-^er been a single Washington
office established to coordinate U.S. relations with Puerto
Rico, and the Executive branch has been inconsistent in its
rhetoric and action. For example, in 1976 President Ford
said "I will submit legislation to Congress requesting the
admission of Puerto Rico to the Union as a state. " Subse-
quently, nothing happened. At the time Ronald Reagan de-
clared his candidacy for the Presidency in 1930 hie stated,
"it is my intention to initiate legislation, shortly after I
become President, requesting statehood for Puerto Rico."
Again, nothing was accomplished to that end.
^
Today what is obvious is that there is some degree of
political friction between George Bush's statehood support-
ers and Puerto Rico's Governor Rafael Hernandez Colon, who
favors continued commonwealth status. When Bush ran in the
19S0 Puerto Rican primary, he made public his commitment to
93. Scott B. MacDonald, Dancing/ On A Volcano, (New York: Prae-
ger, 1 9 & £ j , p. 82
94. Major Benigno Sierra- Irizarry , Puerto Rican Statehood and
the Caribbean Basin Stability, (Maxwell AFB, Al. : Air Com-
mand and Staff College Air University) p. 27, photocopied.
69
statehood. As President of the United States, Bush endorsed
the plebiscite and reaffirmed the Republican party's tradi-
tional support for statehood. Ever since, there has been
criticism from Colon that the language of the bill spon-
sored by the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee
appears to favor statehood over the other options. Governor
Colon also criticized two White House aides for spending an
entire week lobbying on the island for statehood. This
activity prompted Colon to ask President Bush to "pull back;
call off your troops. " He added that "the people of Puerto
Rico have the intelligence, the capability, the desire and
the good common sense to mai e our own decision.
On the other hand, Puerto Rican political parties that
support statehood are delighted with the apparent U.S.
preference for statehood. Former Governor and President of
the New Progressive Party, Carlos Romero Barcelo had this to
say about the situation:
There is no single event that I can think of that
would do more to improve the United States' relations
with Latin America than accepting Puerto Rico as a
state. It would say: "We can work with Spanish-speak-
ing people. Ule don't think of our selves as superior as
you think we do.
95. Martin Tolchin, "Puerto Rico Chief Says U.S. Exerts Pressure
for Statehood", The New York Times, 17 May 1990.
96. Jeffrey Schmalz, "Wtih U.S. Help, Fuerto Rico Seeks its Own
Identity", New York Times, 10 Juy 1989. p. A9.
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There is one thing that supporters of statehood and
commonwealth are united in: fear that independence leader-
ship would turn Puerto Rico into a Marxist state as an
inevitable result of economic disaster. Although proponents
of independence are not hesitant in expressing their will-
ingness to give up U.S. aid in exchange for independence,
there is no evidence that links independence advocates to
support of Marxist ideology. In the event that independ-
ence becomes the people's choice, the United States should
be prepared to continue with some sort of adequate financial
aid to the island to preclude a fall to Marxism.
The current state of world affairs in which the United
States finds itself both the victor in the Cold War and
undisputed global power, has had a peculiar effect on the
traditional views on U.S. foreign policy associated with the
American conservative right and the liberal left. This may
have a direct influence on United States Puerto Rico rela-
tions by directing the course of future policy action con-
cerning the island's status. For example, during the Cold
War Era, political thinkers of the far right persuasion were
most vocal in advocating an aggressive, highly visible role
for the United States in world affairs. The post Cold War
Era has seen a curious split in the foreign policy outlook
by members of the right. Some have now adopted an American
isolationist view which is contrary to the traditional
perception of extensive American responsibilities on the
world stage. Influential political thinkers such as right-
wing, conservative, syndicated columnist Patrick Buchanan
are now implying that the United States should take on more
inward-looking policies, to the exclusion of possible state-
hood for Puerto Rico. In their estimation, this is not the
time for the United States to initiate a plebiscite in which
the United States could be bound to the admission of Puerto
Rico as the 51st state.
Their objections are not based solely on legitimate
fears over the fiscal costs associated with the possibility
of statehood. Separatism is now in vogue around the world.
The break-up of the Soviet empire is a vivid example of the
enduring power of nationalism and cultural distinction.
Perhaps some see a parallel situation with Puerto Rico in
that the Soviet Union was comprised of people who had been,
for the most pert, involuntarily classified as Soviet
citizens although they were in fact non-Russian members of
distinct, cultural nations. The not so subtle implication
raised by some right-wing conservatives is that while a
particular group of people might be classified as United
States citizens, that does not mean that they are perceived
as Americans, nor does it mean that the group necessarily
wants to be perceived strictly as American. Therefore,
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people like Patrick Buchanan put forth the hypothesis that
" Ule may be about to create a Northern Ireland in the Carib-
..9 7bean. v/
Mr. Buchanan goes on to call up the specter of the Civil
War which was fought to stop Confederate states from seced-
1 ng Are we prepared to send troops, if the people of
Puerto Rico should later change their minds? The polls
taken in Puerto Rico that indicate up to half of all island-
ers are in favor of statehood, is in fact the biggest
detractor of status legislation from the isolationist view-
point .
On the other hand, support for a referendum has also come
from the far right as well as the left for a number of
possible reasons. Re-publican Senator James A. McClure clear-
ly represents an ultra-conservative whose actions manifest a
deep commitment to Puerto Rico status legislation. There is
perhaps the unspoken accusation on the part of some members
of the right that the current status represents a state of
"neocolonialism" that has outlived its usefulness. Further-
more, once the United States made the decision to confer
American citizenship on the Puerto Ricans, it had in fact
committed itself to granting statehood.
97. Patrick Buchanan, "Puerto Rico as Our 51st?




It is not yet clear if future U.S. foreign policy will
be more a product of the current attractiveness of returning
to American isolationist roots, or more of heightened in-
volvement and responsibility in world affairs. Either stance
could have an impact on when and if Puerto Rico status
legislation comes to pass.
C. ECONOMIC
Puerto Rico's future status could have an impact on the
United States foreign economic policy known as the Caribbean
Basin Initiative [CGI). An independent Puerto Rico would be
entitled to the same provisions now enjoyed by Central
America, South America, and the entire Caribbean Basin.
Absolute levels of economic assistance to the region have
declined since PY 1989, because of U.S. efforts to reduce
, . 90the government s budget deficit. ' The result is that
Puerto Rico's increased level of participation means that
there will be less to go around for everyone else.
An independent Puerto Rico may also spell the loss of
oil, that one commodity that has the ability to shape U.S.
foreign policy, as evidenced by the Gulf crisis. The sharp
increase in U.S. oil consumption demands have helped Puerto
Rico to make a significant contribution to the Caribbean oil
industry. Two of the three oil refineries in Puerto Rico
99. Sandra W. Medtiz and Dennis M. Hanratty, eds, Islands Of The
Commonwealth Caribbean : a regional study, (Washington D.C.
:
Federal Reserve Division of the Library of Congress, 1989),
p. 665.
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are owned by major U.S. oil companies. Gulf Oil refinery,
located at Bayamon, refines 138,000 barrels per day. At
Yabucoa, the Sun Oil refinery is capable of refining 100,000
barrels p>er day. The independent company, Commonwealth Oil
Refining, refines 160,000 barrels per day at the Penuelas
refiner) . In addition, extensive offshore and onshore explo-
ration are taking place on the North Coast and in Terrato.
U.S. production firms have been encouraged by the results of
seismic geological exploration..
A majority vote cast in favor of continued commonwealth
status could also have hidden consequences that would have
an impact on foreign policy. Integration of Puerto Rico's
economy into the United States has not relieved the problems
of import dependency or trade imbalance, hence the long-term
viability of the island has not been assured. It is possi-
ble that the federal government may come to view the Puerto
i piRican economy as an unacceftable social burden.
As is the case in the rest of the region, the polit-
ical fallout of these socioeconomic problems is diffi-
cult to measure. But uncertainties only mask potential-
ly severe security problems.
100. Raymond J. Cully, Jr. , The Strategic Importance' of Caribbean
Oil Facilities to the United States, (Fort Leavenworth: U.S.
Army Command and General Staff College, 1981) pp. 28-29
101. Thomas H. floorer and Georges A. Fauriol, "Caribbean Basin
Security", The Washington Papers, p. 43.
102. Ibid, p. 44.
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On one hand, Puerto Rico's struggling economy could be
doing much better, on the other, Puerto Rico has been suc-
cessful in using the commonwealth status to perform a serv-
ice for the United States in the area of economic growth and
stability in the Caribbean. Por example, in 1985, Puerto
Rico established the Caribbean Development Program. This
program has used over $632 million dollars of section 936
funding to finance, market, and promote £7 projects for 12
CE1 members. [see table 3.1] This represents aid to a
Caribbean market comprised of 50 million people with a
domestic output of $75 billion and whose trade is worth more
1 D3than $65 billion. Section 936 would not be available
under statehood or independence, thus the commonwealth
option provides a unique opportunity for Puerto Rico to play
a significant role in the economic development of the Carib-
bean.
D. TERRORISM
Puerto Rico has played a key role in the nature of
American influence in the region. Specifically, Puerto
Rican nationalism and the possibility of terrorist action
on the island as well as mainland is an influence that
figures into regional security policy just as much as revo-
lution in Nicaragua, insurgency in El Salvador, or Cuban
communi sm
.











Earbados $ 14,680,000 $ 13,750,000
Costa Rica 11 10, 574, 000
Dominican
Republ ic 4 3 180, 315, 000 126,000,000
Domini ca 2, 600, 000 2, 100, 000
Grenada 2, 602, 000
Guatemala .00, 000
Haiti 1, 415, 000
Jamaica 10 185, 109, 000 177,980, 000
Panama 140, 000
>t. Kitts 500, 000
Trinidad 190, 270, 000 135, 000, 000
U. S. V. I 42, 135, 000 36, 135, 000
Totals: 87 $631 , 840, 000 $491 , 885, 000
Source: Caribbean Development Office, February 1991
77
Terrorism on the part of some Nationalists who seek
independence is not a new phenomenon. In September of 1922,
the Puerto Rican Nationalist Party (PRNP) formed with the
main objective of destroying the existing government by any
means, in order to end U.S. dominion and establish an
independent island. Given that less than 10% of the
Puerto Rican population favors independence, a small group
of radical Nationalist have resorted to terrorism in an
attempt to influence the future status.
The first major mainland terrorist act occurred in 1950
when two revolver-packing Nationalists attempted to assassi-
nate U.S. President Harry S. Truman at his temporary Penn-
sylvania Avenue residence. Just four years later, four
Nationalists indiscriminately fired bullets into the gallery
of the Washington House of Representatives. Their goal was
to gain notoriety in the world press and to embarrass the
United States at the Tenth Conference on Inter-American
IDSAffairs at Caracas.
Since then, Puerto Rican terrorist groups have gone
through several phases of merging and splintering. Today
the best known group and most active within the continental
U.S. since 1974 is the Fuerzas Armadas de Liberacion Nacion-
104. Thomas Burns, "United States and Western European Terrorist
Groups - Current Status and future Perspective", Technical
Report, 29 September, 1982, p. 18
105. Earl Parker Hanson, Trans format ion : The Story of Modern
Puerto Rico, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1955) pp. 79-
80.
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al (FALN). Their declared goal is nationhood; their pre-
ferred tactic is continental bombings. In 1982 targeted
areas included the American Stock Exchange and the Chase
Manhattan Bank. These incidents notwithstanding, FALN activ-
ity has been severely curtailed subsequent to the arrest
and imprisonment of several key leaders. There are at least
seven other identifiable Puerto Rican terrorist groups that
have been successful in carrying out violent acts in the
1 6 - •United States arid on the island. In addition, there are
various island and continental Puerto Rican political groups
that endorse terrorist organization activities.
These groups can be expected to become more active if and
when the plebiscite is actually held. This poses a most
serious problem given that the number of terrorist incidents
claimed by groups supportive of Puerto Rican independence
outnumbers those claimed by all other Jewish, Cuban, Armeni-
an and Islamic separatist groups. The United States
intelligence community should consider the implications of
the results of surveys conducted in Puerto Rico that con-
sistently show the number of Puerto Ricans favoring inde-
pendence is 10% and often less, while a 1989 [see table
106. William Sater, Puerto Rican Terrorists : A Possible Threat
To U.S. Energy Installations'? (Santa Monica: A Rand Note,
1981), pp. v-vi
107. Bonnie Cordes, Bruce Hoffman, Brian M. Jenkins, Konrad
Keller, Sue Moran, and William Sater, Trends in Interna-
tional Terrorism, 1982 and 1983, (Santa Monica: Rand
Corporation R-3183-SL), p. 3.
7Q
4.1] survey taken of persons of Puerto Rican origin residing
in New York City showed a significant number of independence
supporters. The July, 1991 Internetional Report story re-
cords that there are approximately 30 radical Puerto Ricans
who consider themselves tc be prisoners of war or political
prisoners. The combination of the presence of radicals and
independence supporters on the mainland represents a poten-
tial security risk if they choose violence as a vehicle for
political expression.
Perhaps the most notorious terrorist group that threatens
American assets primarily in Puerto Rico is the Borinquen
People's Army - Macheteros. In the early 1980' s this group
was responsible for three deaths, one armed robbery, and
numerous bombings resulting in significant damage. For
example, 40 million dollars worth of damage was caused when
bombs destroyed over nine military jet fighters at the
Muniz Air National Guard base. Over ten million dollars of
damage was wrought when bomb blasts damaged two electricity
substations. The Macheteros have also targeted U.S. military
personnel for attack, in an attempt to rid the island of
"occupation forces". In one such attack, terrorists tried
to assassinate three U.S. Army officers in San Juan. In
1979, an attack took place upon a bus carrying U.S. Navy
personnel at Sabana Seca.
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Table 4 . 1
Support for Status Options,







Source: Adapted from Victor Rodriguez, "Democracy and
Decolonization", International Report, July 1991, p. 3
tf 1
Two U.S. sailors lost their lives and ten others were
1 n.°
wounded.
There are several key points that should be noted:
(a) The tlacheteros are a thriving group that emphasize
attacks on military or high value economic targets while the
FALN target low value commercial or civilian U.S. govern-
ment offices, and is by and large defunct;
(b) Incidents of mainland attacks have declined, while
on the island they have increased.
(c) While Puerto Rican terrorist groups espouse Marxist-
Leninist ideology, they are first and foremost devoted to
separatism rather than socialism.
Cd) Terrorism is likely to continue to be a threat
because the democratically-determined political choice will
most likely not be that of independence; however, if inde-
pendence were chosen, Puerto Rican terrorist groups would no
longer have a reason for action.
(e) Terrorist threats against the nuclear industry must
be taken seriously even though the tactics and weapons do
109
not indicate the capability for a successful attack.
10S. Thomas Eurns, "United States and Western European Terrorist
Groups", Technical Report, 29 September 19S2, pp. 20-21.
109. William Sater, Puerto Rican Terrorist : A Possible Threat
To U.S. Enercjy Installations?, (Santa Monies: Rand Note
N-1764-SC, October 1981), p. vii.
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One interest i rig and perhaps far more dangerous branch of
political terrorism emanates not from pro- independence
forces, but potentially from right-wing counter-terrorists.
Although such a danger of significant magnitude has yet to
be realized, a bomb attack in a Mayaguez restaurant in
Puerto Rico known to be frequented by pro-independence
groups resulted in the death of two people.
E. INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY
The status of Puerto Rico has largely been an issue
involving two political actors: the United States and Puerto
Rico. From time to time though, the international community
has functioned as. a third political actor to influence the
shape of Puerto Rico's political status. In the past, Cuban
protests over Puerto Rico and the adversarial relationship
with the United States have figured most prominently in this
aspect of international involvement. This time around, it
could be the United States that uses the Puerto Rico issue
as a bridge between the American and Cuban governments,
given Puerto Rico's close historical and cultural ties to
Cuba
.
The United Nations has been the dominant element of the
international community to involve itself in Puerto Rico's
status. The post-UUII international climate was one of
decolonization and in December of 1946, the General Assembly
put together a declaration that encompassed the principle
that relations between friendly nations should be based on
respect for equal rights and self-determination. The Decla-
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ration Regarding Non-Self Governing Territories was intended
to see that certain territories, including Puerto Rico at-
tained a state of self-government.
The United States was required to report on the state of
Puerto Rico's affairs under the United Nations' system of
accountability. Thus, at least once a year, Puerto Rico's
political status came under world scrutiny. Perhaps the
combination of international accountability requirements and
the contradiction between America's possession of various
territories and her lead role in decolonization hastened the
process that led to the 1952 formalization of a new rela-
tionship between Puerto Rico and the United States based on
the end of direct U.S. administration.
The United States had satisfied the U.N. requirements
for the removal of F'uerto Rico from the list of non-self
governing territories in the eyes of the majority of Latin
American governments. When the issue came up for a U.N.
vote, only the Mexican and Guatemalan governments opposed
Puerto Rico's removal from the list, while Argentina and
Venezuela abstained from voting. The implication here is
that because Latin Americans share feelings of kinship with
Puerto Rico, and the majority of Latin American nations
signaled their approval of United States policy toward
Puerto Rico, the status issue served to further the opportu-
110. Richard J. Bloomfield, ed. , Puerto Rico: The Search for a
Nat ionsl Policy, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1985), p. 101.
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nity for increasing the level of good-will between the
United States and Latin America.
If there are two countries that did not experience feel-
ings of increased good-will towards the United States be-
cause of the Puerto Rico status issue, it would be Cuba and
the Soviet Union. Recent political as well economic changes
within the Soviet Union have radically altered both the
Soviet rhetoric of the 1960s and 1970s as well as the rele-
vance of Soviet opinion of this issue to the United States.
On the- other hand, Cuba continues to bring the issue of
Puerto Rico's status before the U.N. General Assembly in
attempts to embarrass the United States and promote negative
views of American foreign policy throughout the Third World,
as it nas since the 1960s.
Cuba's interest in Puerto Rico is not merely a conven-
ient propaganda tool. Indeed, U.S. policymakers would do
well to remember that not only are there historical politi-
cal ties between the forces of Cuban nationalism and Puerto
Rican independence, but in general, cultural ties between
the two Hispanic islands.
It is precisely those ties that the United States could
explore as a possible avenue for rapprochement. Throughout
the Caribbean and Latin America, countries such as Nicara-
gua, Panama, Grenada, Argentina, Brazil and others have all
experienced a much heralded wave of democratic reform that
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has resulted in Cuba becoming one of the last bastion of
dictatorship in this area. United States foreign policy
analysts have assessed these developments in relation to
the viability of prospects for political change in Cuba. A
resolution to the Puerto Rico status issue could be useful
in bringing democracy to Cuba.
If Castro is removed from power or dies in office, it
will not necessarily signal the end of Cuban anti-
Americanism, or distrust of United States foreign policy in
Latin America. The first step towards reconciliation could
very well be a freely-held referendum on the Puerto Rican
status, in which the United States Congress agrees to abide
by the results. Such action could partially allay Cuban
fears of American imperialism, while simultaneously opening
up a path of communication via Cuba's Puerto Rican neigh-
bors. In addition, Puerto Rico could serve as a conduit for
highly desirable economic incentives to Cuba by setting up
joint ventures, twin factories and assistance from the
Caribbean Basin Initiative.
In summary, this section examined implications for U.S.
policy and concludes that it is both the military and eco-
nomic factors that are of equal importance and influence in
this issue.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
In the 19b7 plebiscite, Puerto Ricans overwhelmingly
cast their votes in favor of retaining the commonwealth
status. Commonwealth may still be the option of choice
among Puerto Ricans due to the perception that no matter how
much Puerto Ricans identify themselves with independent
Latin American countries, Puerto Rico is inextricably inter-
twined, culturally arid economically, with the United States.
The enhanced commonwealth option is also the better choice
from the perspective of the United States government as
well. It is far less costly than statehood, and far more
likely than independence. Lastly, it is a political status
guaranteed to preserve identified U.S. national security
interests
.
The period in 1991 in which it appeared that Puerto
Ricans were well on their way to having a plebiscite oc-
curred because the three major Puerto Rican political par-
ties galvanized, and President Bush nudged Congress to
begin drafting the necessary status legislation. What fol-
lowed was an intense period where lobbying organizations
pressed the American Congress strongly for their respective
status choice without having obtained a clear, popular
consensus from Puerto Ricans. At the same time, the state-
hood option was being pushed vigorously by some top U.S.
officials, including President Bush. The primary reason for
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statehood being the most favored option for some in Washing-
ton is that it would once and for all define Puerto Rico's
political status, and thus provide a permanent premise for
U.S. -Puerto Rican relations and the formation of policy in
the region. Thus it seemed as though the question of Puerto
Rico's future status was and should be determined on three
levels: How highly is political and economic independence
valued? How deeply do the Puerto Ricans feel their political
impotence" And lastly, are economic advantages associated
with dependency enough compensation for second-class Ameri-
can citizenship? However, these considerations are primarily
from the Puerto Rican perspective, and at this time there is
no fool-proof barometer for measuring the true feelings of
the Puerto Rican people. The absence of a clear status
consensus only serves to make these considerations of sec-
ondary importance in their ability to influence the outcome
of this issue.
The reality of the situation is this: The United States
Congress has been the primary definer of Puerto Rico's
political status since 1900. Furthermore, the status ques-
tion represents one of many matters of U.S. national inter-
ests that will be decided mostly by the action or inaction
of the American Congress, despite the wishes of the current
President. No Congress, now or in the future, will likely
produce binding referendum legislation without having first
obtained persuasive confirmation that there is a consensus
8£
in Puerto Rico on the status of -choice. A lead in the state-
hood or independence option (the two most drastic political
status changes) should clearly reflect that the particular
selection is the desire of at least 60 percent to 70 percent
of the Puerto Rican population. To implement a binding
choice in a plebiscite where possibly one option is chosen
by 50 percent or less of the population, would at the very
least invite radical terrorist action on the mainland, as
well as on the island.
Given that there is no clear consensus at this time, the
United States national interest is best served by Puerto
Pico remaining in the commonwealth status. This by no means
a recommendation that U.S. officials permanently endorse the
status quo. On the contrary, in the absence of a plebi-
scite, the American Congress can institute specific enhanced
commonwealth features to improve economic and political
conditions. In addition, this issue will continue to burn in
the hearts and minds of many Puerto Ricans because of dis-
satisfaction with some political and economic aspects of the
current commonwealth status. It is stressed that a Puerto
Rican plebiscite is at some point virtually inevitable, and
that the enhanced commonwealth status is most beneficial to
the United States. Subsequent to the 1992 island elections,
periodic polls should be taken to monitor status preferences
in Puerto Rico, until a 60% or more consensus is reached. At
such time, Puerto Rican political leaders should once again
RQ
present a united request to the American Congress for plebi-
scite legislation.
Given that the premise is that Puerto Ricans can and
will have the opportunity to vote on their political status,
then the Congress of the future that finally enacts the
legislation should enjoy an enormous advantage because the
majority of the background work for identifying and preserv-
ing United States national interest as concerns the island
has already been completed thanks to the efforts of Senators
J. Bennett Johnson and James A. McClure. In the meantime,
Congress should continue to take time for fine-tuning points
of the se If -execut ing legislation pertaining to each possi-
ble option.
Regardless of reslpolitik limitations, Puerto Ricans
should decide what will be the course for the island in
keeping with America's assertion that self-determination is
a fundamental political right of man.
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